by Barry Goldman

The term legaldegook appears to have been coined by Bryan A. Garner. He is the author of several books on language in general and legal language in particular. Garner co-wrote a book with Antonin Scalia called Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts. He is a leader in the plain English movement. The idea there is that legalese unnecessarily complicates things. If we could scrape away the legaldegook and get down to bedrock, simple language, the theory goes, the law would be clear and understandable, and everyone would be happier.
This is partly true. Legal language is often ridiculously complicated. It’s fun to come up with examples. Garner and his colleagues used to publish The Legaldegook Awards for particularly egregious passages. Here’s one winner:
No savings and loan holding company, directly or indirectly, or through one or more transactions, shall … [a]cquire control of an uninsured institution or retain, for more than one year after other than an insured institution or holding company thereof, the date any insured institution subsidiary becomes uninsured, control of such institution. 12 C.F.R. § 584.4(b) (1989)
This is obviously gibberish. And it is equally obvious that it would be a good idea to reduce the amount of gibberish in the Code of Federal Regulations. But the overall theory is false. The sad truth is there is no bedrock. Beneath the confusion there is only more confusion. It’s legaldegook all the way down.
From time to time, legal scholars acknowledge this. The great Lon Fuller wrote:
Formal legal principles of interpretation… tend to come in offsetting pairs. One can find a maxim according to which when you say “trees” you must mean shrubs also, shrubs being so much like trees. By another maxim one can argue that when you say “trees” you must mean to exclude shrubs because if you had meant shrubs you would have said so; shrubs being so much like trees, and so naturally suggested by them, you couldn’t have forgotten about them when you said “trees” and stopped.
I have written both decisions many times myself. I have said “the drafters know how to say X. They said it in Article 1 and Article 2. If they had meant X in Article 3 they would have said it there too.” And I have said, “The purpose of Article 3 is clear from the context. The drafters clearly intended to prohibit Y and Z. To prohibit Y and Z and at the same time to allow X would defeat the obvious purpose of the provision. As a matter of simple logic, that cannot have been the intent of the drafters.”
My point is, you can scrape away as many layers as you like, ultimately someone is going to have to make a determination about the meaning of the language in a legal document. It is not going to interpret itself. Read more »


One of my New Year’s resolutions was to read one of the “classics of fiction” each month this year. I’m happy to report that I’m on pace to succeed. 
As AI insinuates itself into our world and our lives with unprecedented speed, it’s important to ask: What sort of thing are we creating, and is this the best way to create it? What we are trying to create, for the first time in human history, is nothing less than a new entity that is a peer – and, some fear, a replacement – for our species. But that is still in the future. What we have today are computational systems that can do many things that were, until very recently, the sole prerogative of the human mind. As these systems acquire more agency and begin to play a much more active role in our lives, it will be critically important that there is mutual comprehension and trust between humans and AI. I have 


“A clearly written and compelling account of the existential risks that highly advanced AI could pose to humanity.” — Ben Bernanke


Natalie Bakopoulos: Thank you so much, Philip, for starting this conversation, and for these wonderful observations and connections. You’re absolutely right, I was indeed playing with the idea of “beginnings.” “Here in Greece,” the narrator says, “the rivers rarely have a single source: They spring from the mountains at several places.” I also wanted to think about the arbitrariness of origin and a way of thinking about belonging that wasn’t necessarily about “roots”—but instead rhizomes, as Edouard Glissant, and others, might say.


The wealthy and powerful have always used the narrative to their advantage. The narrative defines them as superior in some way, and thus deserving of their power and wealth. In ancient times, they might be descended from the Gods, or at least favored by them or otherwise connected to them, perhaps through special communicative powers that granted them insights into the will of the Gods or God. In modern capitalist societies, that narrative promotes a fantasy of merit. You are rich and/or powerful because you are better. You are more civilized, better educated, more intelligent, or blessed with an exceptional work ethic. These narratives cast wealth and/or power as not only justifiable, but deserved.

