by Tim Sommers

This is the second of two parts [part 1 is here] on whether implanted beliefs can count as knowledge. The question matters outside science fiction. If installed beliefs can be true, reliable, and useful and still fall short of knowledge, then knowledge needs some further condition, one that goes beyond the standard “justified true belief” formula. So, first, what is belief installation?
Belief installation is (i) the direct production of a belief in a person (ii) by an outside process (iii) that skips over her perception, the testimony available to her, and her reasoning. In the cases that interest us, (iv) the installed belief is true, (v) the installing process is reliable, (vi) the belief, once installed, is stable and fits with the person’s other beliefs, and (vii) the belief is available for use in reasoning and action. For example, you are at trivia night. You start to say that Eric Roberts has appeared in more films than anyone else (809 and counting). Then you remember, thanks to the trivia bonus pack that came with your French language implant for work, that the Indian comic actor Brahmanandam Kanneganti has appeared in more than a thousand. Do you know that Kanneganti is the most prolific film actor of all time? Or is this more like cheating by looking it up on your phone? If justification is about reliability, can an outside process’s reliability give you knowledge?
The installation case points to an agency condition on knowledge. Roughly, a person knows that p only if her believing p is an exercise of her own epistemic agency, or is properly anchored in it. In plainer terms, knowledge has to be tied to the person’s own capacities for inquiry, evaluation, and responsiveness to reasons. Installed beliefs, however true and however reliably produced, fail this test. That is why they strike us as less than knowledge, even when we find nothing wrong with them on grounds of reliability.
Reliabilism, in its simplest form, says that a true belief is justified, and so counts as knowledge, when a belief-forming process reliably yields truths. The installation device is such a process. In fact, by hypothesis, it is more reliable than perception, memory, or testimony. Think of perception in poor light, memory over long stretches of time, or testimony from ordinary, fallible informants. How, then, can the reliabilist deny that Stacey knows her implanted beliefs? Read more »

I met Derrida in Memphis in 1993. We were standing by a pool and he was smoking a cigar. I’m sure I was smoking a cigarette. I was twenty-four.

I count among my simple pleasures a walk to a pocket beach not far from my home. Tucked between a couple of small headlands, barely 100 yards long, it overlooks Juan de Fuca Strait, separating Vancouver Island from Washington’s Olympic Peninsula to the south. It’s a quiet spot, empty of the summer crowds that flock to beaches elsewhere in the city, and for that reason a treasured refuge for readers and romantics in search of solitude with a tranquil view of snowy peaks. There’s always the possibility of sighting a pod of the killer whales that frequent these waters.
It’s not intimate, it’s philosophy. That sounds like something ChatGPT would say but there is truth in it. Philosophical writing is seldom intimate. When philosophical writing styles are discussed, Nietzsche is usually trotted out as the example that avoids the calculated, dispassionate, heavily qualified tone of philosophy. But intimate? No. Nietzsche was too busy shouting at the reader to achieve intimacy.
Sughra Raza. Winter Clouds, Boston, December 2025.
Chief Justice Roberts in his 2005 confirmation hearing famously testified that as a Supreme Court justice his job was not to “pitch or bat” but to be an “umpire” calling “balls and strikes.” History since suggests otherwise. In collaboration with his conservative colleagues on the court, Roberts has been more like an agenda-driven baseball commissioner calling the shots by re- defining the rules of the game. He has led the court to grant Trump and other presidents virtual immunity from criminal prosecution and to seal the deal for the idea of a unitary presidency which subordinates independent regulatory agencies, inspector generals, and the Department of Justice to a single president’s will even if Congress has legislated otherwise.


The world of unquestioned American leadership is gone, and the next American president cannot restore the trust of America’s allies. Donald Trump’s critics have spent a decade condemning his unforced squandering of American influence as needless, senseless and lots of other things besides. It’s time to come to grips, move past complaining and get to work building what comes next.