by Marianne Janack

The distinction between utopias and dystopias is often murky. In Ursula LeGuin’s story, “The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas”, a utopian society is built on suffering; Lois Lowry’s The Giver portrays a world in which the absence of pain depends on the absence of choice; Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World portrays a world in which war, poverty and unhappiness have been eradicated because individuality and competition have disappeared.
And then there’s John Calhoun’s experiment with mice. In 1968, Calhoun put 4 breeding pairs of house mice into a mouse utopia that came to be called Universe 25: no predators, plenty of space, lots of clean nesting material, more than enough food and water, weather control, and no disease. Calhoun housed the mice in a large enclosure that would allow them all to live and reproduce in peace, with plenty of resources and no dangers from predators or diseases. It took 104 days before the first litter of mice was born, but after that the population doubled every 55 days, until the population reached 620 on day 315. Calhoun called this Phase B: the phase during which the utopic conditions seemed to encourage population growth and happy mice.. After that, the population explosion slowed down, doubling every 145 days. It peaked at about 2200.
The asymmetrical patterns of nesting and reproduction that Calhoun and his assistants saw as the experiment ran demanded explanation. Calhoun said that the patterns were evidence of a social hierarchy among the mice: the more reproductively successful the mouse, the higher it ranked in the mouse society of Universe 25. The most dominant males were the most active, and had the greatest reproductive success. A pecking order of dominance and reproductive success was the best explanation for the asymmetrical nesting and reproduction patterns that Calhoun and his assistants noticed in the box “utopia.”
At the end of Phase B there were 150 adults and 470 juveniles. In their natural habitats, fewer of the juveniles would have survived. And that, it turns out, was where the trouble started. Read more »




I met Derrida in Memphis in 1993. We were standing by a pool and he was smoking a cigar. I’m sure I was smoking a cigarette. I was twenty-four.

I count among my simple pleasures a walk to a pocket beach not far from my home. Tucked between a couple of small headlands, barely 100 yards long, it overlooks Juan de Fuca Strait, separating Vancouver Island from Washington’s Olympic Peninsula to the south. It’s a quiet spot, empty of the summer crowds that flock to beaches elsewhere in the city, and for that reason a treasured refuge for readers and romantics in search of solitude with a tranquil view of snowy peaks. There’s always the possibility of sighting a pod of the killer whales that frequent these waters.
It’s not intimate, it’s philosophy. That sounds like something ChatGPT would say but there is truth in it. Philosophical writing is seldom intimate. When philosophical writing styles are discussed, Nietzsche is usually trotted out as the example that avoids the calculated, dispassionate, heavily qualified tone of philosophy. But intimate? No. Nietzsche was too busy shouting at the reader to achieve intimacy.
Sughra Raza. Winter Clouds, Boston, December 2025.
Chief Justice Roberts in his 2005 confirmation hearing famously testified that as a Supreme Court justice his job was not to “pitch or bat” but to be an “umpire” calling “balls and strikes.” History since suggests otherwise. In collaboration with his conservative colleagues on the court, Roberts has been more like an agenda-driven baseball commissioner calling the shots by re- defining the rules of the game. He has led the court to grant Trump and other presidents virtual immunity from criminal prosecution and to seal the deal for the idea of a unitary presidency which subordinates independent regulatory agencies, inspector generals, and the Department of Justice to a single president’s will even if Congress has legislated otherwise.
