by Jim Hanas
Looking back I see that my undergraduate education—as seen through my three (one merely attempted) majors—was a tour through the grammatical persons. I started out majoring in political science (and studying Latin, to my lasting regret), because I thought I wanted to be a lawyer. Third-person plural.
I quickly switched to psychology, which was divided between third-person singular (experimental psychology) and second-person singular (clinical psychology). This alone should have been the clue that psychology might not be a science, but there were others. Outside of the statistics classes—reassuring as they were to the field’s aspirations—all the textbooks had the same plot. Unlike math or chemistry textbooks, which I assume are at least technically progressive, psychology textbooks were a tour of incommensurate, historically explored possibilities, with chapters on psychodynamic theory, Gestalt, behaviorism, and—finally—the then-nascent field of neuroscience. The apotheosis of the field’s haplessness appeared in each textbook with the appearance of the “diathesis–stress model” of schizophrenia, which proposed that psychopathology arose from a combination of genetic predisposition and environmental factors. No kidding.
This sent me across campus to the philosophy department, where I discovered phenomenology, which—at its most rigorous—is the systematic investigation and description of first-person singular experience. “Lived experience” has become a cri de cœur in recent years, in which I hear the echoes of Husserlian Erlebnis or Sartre’s l’expérience vécue, though—as with many things—current usage is a memed-down version meant to evince uninterrogable private experience. But, or so phenomenology claims, there is a lot that can be said and communicated about the structure of these private experiences. For example, the idea of an object and the object itself, while sharing the same content, have different phenomenological properties. One appears in time and space, is experienced as having permanence, etc., while the other does not. Almost any first-person experience—from the experience of mathematical proofs to elusive states like ennui—can be the subject of such investigations.
I graduated with a double major in psychology and philosophy and—in the four decades since—it does not appear that much progress has been made in reconciling the third-person view with the first-person view. Psychology with philosophy. Read more »

Road trips were a staple of my childhood.
Most politicians pledge to 

AI is collapsing barriers in scientific disciplines, most notably in math. An 87-year old conjecture named the
1. The Odyssey
Sughra Raza. Fly Paper (sunset series). Late July, 2026.






Zeno’s Conscience (1923) by Italo Svevo is the story of one such man suffering from talking too much (to himself). Zeno is a person with deep interiority, long meandering monologues, and feeling. However, despite his never-ending rhetorical skills and eccentricity—having gone through the tunnels of his mind many times over—he ironically enough lacks a conscience. He fails in health, in love, in his addictions, and in business. Rumination and ceaseless inner conversation do not produce moral clarity for Zeno. Instead, his often-comical interior life is insidious because his obsession with sentimentality and grand justifications prevents his self-actualization. And so, he lacks a real moral center. However, he does not fail to be incredibly entertaining as a personality.

