by Omar Baig
“One day, after I had completed my studies” at École normale supérieure, philosopher François Laruelle reminisces in From Decision to Heresy (2012), “I sat at my desk and I cleared away all the books of everything that had already been written” (1). On a blank sheet of paper, Laruelle resumed taking notes, except this time he scoured himself for insights. Before starting his master’s thesis, “The Absence of Being,” however, he saw Michelangelo Antonioni’s moody, atmospheric film, La Notte (1961): inspiring Laruelle to inform his legendary graduate supervisor, Paul Ricoeur, of his intent to abandon their planned exegesis of G.W.F. Hegel’s early work. After earning his doctorate, he spent the next three decades quietly pondering the materiality of philosophy and, by the 1980s, explored philosophy as the material for an art.

Instead of pursuing so-called philosophical wisdom, Laruelle wondered if he could make art with philosophy or make poetry of thought that expresses “something poetic with concepts.” He sought to “forward some philosophical thesis” or “practice that could destroy, in a certain way, the classical usage of philosophy” (Heresy, 29). His first five books, from 1971 to 1981, offered fairly standard critiques of French and German philosophers: like Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, Giles Deleuze, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Jacques Derrida; yet he did not probe “the destruction of philosophy” until his sixth and seventh books in 1981 and 1985. Deconstructionists, like Derrida and Ricoeur, momentarily eclipsed the then prevailing phenomenological approach of their predecessors, such as Husserl and Heidegger: “only to become precisely a repetition of Philosophy or philosophy qua philosophy” (Principles, xiv).
Even these iconoclasts, however, had ultimately protected the dignity of philosophy and bared the burden of their homage, affirming the very tradition they once rebelled against: which relies on opposing poles, or philosophical dyad—like subject vs. object, transcendental idealism, etc.—claims to “reinvent” how human’s access or translate between their subjective experiences and an external reality. Yet philosophers can neither “objectively” translate reality into definitive true or false statements nor verify its claims outside their recursive expression (i.e., by language games): which both over- and under-determine reality with each account. In short, philosophy was made for man, as “the pure and general form of the World and the World as the immanent object of philosophy,” but man was not made for philosophy (xx). Instead of philosophical homage, Laruelle integrates scientific theories and practices to life. Read more »


According to the website Rotten Tomatoes, there are four types of movies: good-good movies, good-bad movies, bad-good movies, and bad-bad movies. These types can be identified using the Rotten Tomatoes score for each movie, particularly the relationship between the critics’ score and the audience’s score. Let me explain. Rotten Tomatoes is a website that collects movie reviews and assigns them a rating of either “fresh” (if the review is positive) or “rotten” (if the review is negative). It then calculates the percentage of fresh reviews and assigns this as a score to the movie. If the score is 60% or greater, the film itself is considered fresh, whereas if the score is lower than 60%, the film is rotten. This is a useful way of rating a movie, but there’s a problem here, too. Let’s imagine every reviewer gives a movie three out of four stars, indicating a good film but not a great one. These reviews would all be classified as fresh, and the film would receive a misleadingly high score of 100% (The Terminator has a 100% rating, for example, while The Godfather does not). Let’s imagine another film receives all two out of four-star reviews. These would be classified as rotten, and the film would receive a rating of 0%, indicating one of the worst movies of all time. But the movie wouldn’t really be that bad.
Is loneliness a choice? Is love?
Presidency College had a good Department of Economics and Political Science. I’d say that the teaching standard at my time there would compare quite favorably with the standard I found later when teaching undergraduate classes in Berkeley. I remember in my first lecture in Berkeley in a large undergraduate class I was using some bit of calculus. After my class a female student came to see me to complain about the use of calculus in class. I told her that I was not using any advanced calculus, so if she brushed up her high school-level calculus she should have no difficulty in following the class. She said that in her high school in Carmel, a California coastal town, there was the option to take either calculus or yoga, and she had chosen the latter. I told her, unhelpfully, that this was a choice unheard-of in the land of yoga, India, and, I thought to myself, certainly in Presidency College.
I live on an island. It happens to be a rather densely populated island, with a surface that seems largely covered by steel, masonry, glass, and architectural curtain wall, with nary a coconut or palm tree in sight. Still, it’s an island.
“The Iliad, or The Poem of Force” is a now-canonical lyrical-critical essay by the French anarchist and Christian mystic, Simone Weil. In it, Weil critiques the
In the late 1960s and early 70s, Pocatello, Idaho, was one of the fastest growing towns in the United States. It was, and still is, a bland little place in the arid montane region of the American West. I don’t know why it mushroomed then; it has since stagnated and even shrunk. Nevertheless, the summer I turned four, my family was one among many who moved to reside there. Our little red brick house, still unfinished on the day we moved in, was the last house at the end of a newly laid street, still half-empty of houses. Our street stretched like a solitary finger into a kind of wilderness, an austere, high-desert landscape that surrounded our foundling residential colony. From my vantage as a child, preoccupied with the flowers, spiders, and thistles that stuck to my socks, I would see this place transformed.
The chill in the early morning air hinted of autumn, yet the intensity of the rising sun promised summer heat. Black Tupelo and Red Maple leaves teased memories of fall with premature wisps of yellow and orange. The sky was a depthless cobalt blue, its crystallinity making everything and everyone shimmer. It makes sense that the stunning weather on that particular morning should become a shared referent for our collective dissonance, a common denominator of terror, mourning, and remembrance spanning two decades.
Margot Livesey’s The Boy in the Field is a mystery novel in the broadest sense of that literary term. Yes, the novel begins with the discovery of a crime, and the perpetrator remains at large for most of the narrative. Yet the “what happened next” of a standard mystery novel concentrates on the three siblings who came upon the victim lying in a field, the reverberations of that event on their young lives, and of the family they are a part of. “Mystery” can reside within all of us, to locate or evade, and that is the deeper reveal that Livesey hunts for in this wise and haunting book.


As we look toward wending our way out of the COVID-19 global health crisis, what tools can we use to make sense of what we are experiencing? For if there is anything self-evident in our current predicament, it is that any given field—medicine, sociology, political science, psychology—are insufficient in isolation. “Pandemic,” from the Greek πάνδημος, means of or belonging to all the people; and the challenges of this pandemic compel us to take a pan-disciplinary approach.
It is time to go home. You can pull down the window shade for some relief; then it’s only 100 degrees. An Air Burkina Fokker F28 has sidled up to join us on the tarmac in Bamako, Mali. Not quite home yet.
There’s a lot we can learn about today’s America by observing the Mormon Church.