We need Freud’s forgotten concept to understand our political crisis

From iai:

We associate Freud with the repression of thoughts and feelings. But he also described a subtler defense: recognizing an uncomfortable truth, yet acting as if it didn’t matter—a phenomenon he called disavowal. In this interview, philosopher Alenka Zupančič, a close collaborator of Slavoj Žižek, argues that disavowal is the key to understanding our political paralysis. From climate change to populism to the performative outrage of social media, Zupančič says the problem isn’t that we deny reality—it’s that we acknowledge it endlessly and keep doing nothing.

Oliver Adelson: Your latest book spans politics, philosophy, psychology, and more, but there’s one concept that you think is essential for making sense of all these areas: disavowal. What is disavowal, and why is it so key for understanding our predicament?

Alenka Zupančič: It’s something that I started to think about really intensely a few years ago. So it’s not that it’s been with me the whole time, but I think it captures something essential—as you put it—about this time. And it’s a very interesting concept, because we are used to this other concept, which is simple denial. You know, denial of climate change, denial of this or that. But disavowal functions in a much more perverse way. Namely, by first fully acknowledging some fact—“I know very well that this is how things are”—but then going on as if this knowledge didn’t really matter or register. So in practice, you just go on as before. And I think this is even more prevalent in our response to different social predicaments than simple denial.

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The Mystery of Transformation in Nature

Elizabeth Sbovoda in Undark:

Who isn’t obsessed with metamorphosis? From the children’s classic “The Very Hungry Caterpillar,” who gorges himself to fuel his dramatic shape-shift, to legless tadpoles that grow to hop over 20 times their body length, we’re transfixed by creatures that appear in one guise, then transform overnight into something else. It’s the closest thing to magic that hard-and-fast biology can conjure.

In “Metamorphosis: A Natural and Human History,” science historian Oren Harman indulges our collective obsession and expands its frontiers in startling ways. Inspired by the impending birth of his own third child, Harman explores the striking minutiae of biological change, mining his research to reflect more broadly on personal and social transformation. “Moons sliver, seeds sprout, empires rise and crumble,” he writes. “Everything in the world around us, including our bodies, is in flux.”

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Tuesday Poem

A Drink of Water

She came every morning to draw water
like an old bat staggering up the field:
The pump’s whooping cough, the bucket clatter
And slow diminuendo as it filled,
Announced her. I recall
Her grey apron, the pocked white enamel
of the brimming bucket, and the treble
Creak of her voice like the pump’s handle.
Nights when a full moon lifted past her gable
It fell back through her window and would lie
Into the water set out on the table.
Where I have dipped to drink again, to be
Faithful to the admonishment of her cup,
Remember the Giver fading off the lip.

by Seamus Heaney
from To Read a Poem
Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1992

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Monday, November 3, 2025

The Dogged, Irrational Persistence of Literary Fiction

Gerald Howard in the New York Times:

I remember the vogue in the ’60s and ’70s for critical essays predicting the imminent “death of the novel.” In Wilfrid Sheed’s mordant portrait of the protagonist of “The Minor Novelist,” he writes, “He tries to keep away from Sunday supplements which discuss the death of the novel. He has a theory that it is bad luck to read more than three articles on this subject a week.” Legions of M.F.A. grads can relate.

And yet, that wounded beast, the literary novel, keeps on being written, being published, and, when the fickle gods smile upon it, even bought and read, as the publishers of Colson Whitehead, Sally Rooney and Percival Everett, to name just three large talents, can attest. If literary fiction is a corpse, it’s a wonderfully animated one.

What I am about to say on this matter may seem perverse, but I think a look back at the instances where great works of literature almost disappeared upon publication or came close to not being published can offer a useful perspective, and even a modicum of hope, that the game is far from over.

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Why the race to scale up AI pretraining is NOT over

Lynette Bye at Transformer:

It’s not that the AI companies are growing their computing power slowly — surprise at the lack of compute put into new training reflects how aggressively they’ve scaled until now. Releasing a one hundred times larger model every two years would demand a tenfold increase in capacity each year, which, You says, is unrealistic. A new model every three years, he says, might be feasible, though that still requires an ambitious five-fold increase in compute every year.

Former OpenAI researcher Rohan Pandey recently claimed in a post on X that people were prematurely jumping to “pretraining is over” before seeing the results of the eye-catching investment in computing power. “Building projects like stargate and colossus2 to actually 100x gpt-4 compute takes time, let the labs cook,” he said.

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The China Tech Canon

Afra Wang at Asterisk:

In 1987, Lei Jun 雷军 was a 21-year-old student in Wuhan University’s computer science program. The book that had set his imagination alight was Fire in the Valley 硅谷之火, which chronicles the evolution of 1970s homebrew hacker culture into global titans like Apple, Microsoft, and IBM. The heroes of that story, of course, were visionaries like Steve Jobs. Lei Jun’s trajectory — he founded Joyo.com (later acquired by Amazon), built Xiaomi into a smartphone colossus, then wagered billions on electric vehicles — would unfold directly from that initial act of reading. His nickname became “L-obs,” a portmanteau fusing “Lei Jun” with “Jobs.”

Last August, the writer Tanner Greer published an influential post on the “Silicon Valley canon.” Tech luminaries like Patrick Collison and Nils Gilman followed up with their own contributions. Lei Jun’s story compels me to ask: What is the Chinese tech canon? What intellectual works fuel Chinese entrepreneurs’ ambitions, running continuously in their cognitive background?

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The Visionary Company of Kathryn Davis

Alex Andriesse at the Paris Review:

A few years after I first read The Thin Place, I found myself interviewing Davis for an issue of The Review of Contemporary Fiction, which I was editing at the time. We talked then, as we still talk now, about writing and animals and the city of Philadelphia, where part of my family is from, and where Davis was born on November 13, 1946. Her childhood in a semidetached house on Woodale Road, at the edge of the affluent suburb of Chestnut Hill, Pennsylvania, has found its way into many of her books. It’s there most directly in the haunted house in Hell (1998), the suburban street in Duplex, and the shared childhood memories of the mysterious “we” who narrate The Silk Road (2019). But once you have entered the labyrinth of Davis’s work, you begin to see it, or sense it, around every corner: an atmosphere of dread ruled by the rituals of parents and the patterns of convention—a place where the important things go unsaid or are spoken in code so that if the children overhear, they won’t understand. A place that anybody in their right mind would try to escape.

As a child, Davis escaped into fairy tales (especially those of Hans Christian Andersen), Lewis Carroll’s Alice books, and the fiction of Virginia Woolf. Later, she went away to the Pennsylvania Academy of Fine Arts, where she studied alongside her girlhood friend Peggy Reavey and Reavey’s future husband David Lynch.

more here.

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Dead and Alive by Zadie Smith – essays for an age of anxiety

Houman Barekat in The Guardian:

In Some Notes on Mediated Time – one of three completely new essays in the collection – Smith recalls how the “dreamy, slo-mo world” of her 1980s childhood gave way, within a generation, to the “anxious, permanent now” of social media. If you lived through that transition, you don’t have to be very old to feel ancient. When this estrangement is compounded by the ordinary anxieties of ageing, cultural commentary becomes inflected with self-pity. Smith’s identification with the protagonist of Todd Field’s Tár, a once revered conductor who finds herself shunned by the younger cohort, takes on existential proportions: “Our backs hurt, the kids don’t like Bach any more – and the seas are rising!”

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Cinema’s Greatest Anatomist: David Cronenberg

Travis Alexander at Aeon Magazine:

‘Just because you’re paranoid doesn’t mean they aren’t after you.’ That’s a quote often, though wrongly, attributed to Joseph Heller’s novel Catch-22 (1961). But it might as well be the theme of Cronenberg’s cult classic Videodrome (1983). The film’s ‘they’ are the menacing minds at Spectacular Optical – a supposed global corporate citizen whose public face is the production of reading glasses for the developing world, while its true business is weapons technology. The company is run by Barry Convex, who tells the hapless protagonist Max Renn (James Woods) not about missiles, but about another product altogether: Videodrome.

The name refers to a top-secret video stream picked up by pirate TV stations like the one Max runs in Toronto – Civic-TV. Part-snuff, part-hardcore porn and entirely unburdened by sentiment, Videodrome delivers in brutal closeup the sadomasochistic torture and murder of its ‘contestants’. Unbothered by the violence and desperate to attract more audience to his flagging station, Max resolves to license Videodrome for Civic-TV.

more here.

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The World’s Greatest Feminist Experiment Was Not Where You’d Think

Jennifer Szalai in The New York Times:

In 1990, when Julia Ioffe was 7 years old, her family left a collapsing Soviet Union for suburban Maryland. Her new classmates never let her forget that she was the “weird Russian girl,” but the disdain, she makes clear, was mutual. Growing up, she looked down on American kids who bragged about seeing a Broadway musical or vacationing in Florida. Ioffe’s idea of a good time was going to the opera and reading Pushkin.

She came by her snobbery honestly. Her family was filled with strong, educated women. Ioffe’s mother was an otolaryngologist turned pathologist; her mother’s mother was a cardiologist; her mother’s mother’s mother was a pediatrician. Another great-grandmother was a chemist who ran her own lab in the 1930s; Ioffe’s paternal grandmother was a chemical engineer who ensured the safety of the Kremlin’s drinking water.

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Sunday, November 2, 2025

The Clash of Civilizationalisms

Hans Kundnani and Srirupa Roy in The Ideas Letter:

During the past decade, there has been what might be called a global civilizational turn as states around the world have increasingly imagined themselves as the representatives of civilizations. A lot has been written about the way that China, India, Russia, and Turkey have framed their foreign policies in civilizational terms—and have even explicitly called themselves “civilizational states.” But many political leaders in Europe and the United States are also increasingly using civilizational language. The very concept of “the West,” which until a decade or so ago seemed to be in decline, is making a comeback, driven in part by the far right, which imagines Western or “Judeo-Christian” civilization as dangerously threatened by Muslim or non-white immigration. Some, like French President Emmanuel Macron, also speak of Europe as a distinct civilization that “can die.”

In order to understand these developments, academics are increasingly using the concept of “civilizationalism” (or “civilizationism”). In particular, the concept denotes the tendency to think of civilizations as distinct and coherent entities and to imagine international politics as a clash of civilizations, as Samuel Huntington famously did in his 1996 book. Civilizational thinking like this is a way of understanding how international politics works that is distinct both from realism (which sees international relations in terms of conflict and cooperation between nation-states) and liberalism (which emphasizes ideology and regime type).

How should we understand civilizationalism? Although there has been an explosion of civilization talk it is not entirely clear whether the concept of civilization is doing the same work in the many different contexts in which it is used. In particular, its exact relationship with the nation-state and with nationalism is disputed and varies across cases. The same goes for its relationship with racism, to which civilizationalism has been historically connected. Finally, whereas civilizationalism is often understood as a defensive foreign policy response to an overbearing West and an outright challenge by non-Western states to the post-WWII liberal international order, it also seems to be connected to domestic economic and political developments—in particular, to neoliberalism.

More here.

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Mexico’s Big Green State

Jose Maria Valenzuela in Phenomenal World:

At Claudia Sheinbaum’s first State of Affairs speech, the President announced the passage of fourteen new energy sector laws after only eleven months in office. Sheinbaum’s series of reforms mark a new era for state-coordination in the energy sector, a vision that has triggered a wave of criticisms from the business community and beyond.

Take, for example, the opinion of Mexican leading climate expert Dr. Adrián Fernandez, who, at the time of Sheinbaum’s election, told the Washington Post that Sheinbaum’s climate views “are incompatible with her promises to continue many of López Obrador’s energy policies […] like strengthening the national oil and electricity companies.” The comment suggests that ambitious decarbonization efforts are incompatible with an energy sector characterized by dominant state-owned enterprises. It is the latter with which many business leaders are primarily concerned.

Critics of the active state in Mexico allege that market intervention generates underinvestment. Furthermore, they claim that Mexican state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are not adequate to competently navigate new waves of technology. And, in the wider North American context, SOEs are thought to put Mexico’s industry in jeopardy by triggering mechanisms of investment protection.

The suspicion of SOEs—whether in general, or specific to the green transition—is unfounded. Most private investment in renewable energy across the globe has been facilitated by long-term supply contracts from SOEs or central government agencies. Out of all solar and wind energy projects, two-thirds are held by Chinese SOEs (incidentally, China has recently confirmed an impressive target of 3,500 Gigawatts of solar and wind by 2035). And new forms of intervention in the energy sector are welcome by investors searching for low-risk investments with long-term return profiles.

More here.

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The world without hegemony

Manjeet S Pardesi and Amitav Acharya in Aeon:

The liberal international order or Pax Americana, the world order built by the United States after the Second World War, is coming to an end. Not surprisingly, this has led to fears of disorder and chaos and, even worse, impending Chinese hegemony or Pax Sinica. Importantly, this mode of thinking that envisages the necessity of a dominant or hegemonic power underwriting global stability was developed by 20th-century US scholars of international relations, and is known as the hegemonic stability theory (HST).

In particular, hegemonic stability theory developed out of the work of the American economist Charles P Kindleberger. In his acclaimed book The World in Depression 1929-1939 (1973), Kindleberger argued that: ‘The world economic system was unstable unless some country stabilised it,’ and that, in 1929, ‘the British couldn’t and the United States wouldn’t.’ While Kindleberger was mainly concerned with economic order, his view was transformed by international relations scholars to associate hegemony with all sorts of things. In particular, a hegemonic power is generally expected to perform one or all of three main roles: first, as the dominant military power that ensures peace and stability; second, as the central economic actor within the global system; and third, as a cultural and ideational leader – either actively disseminating its political ideas across the system or serving as a model that others seek to emulate.

HST extends to all aspects of Pax Americana, and US naval power is seen as a ‘public good’ provided by the hegemon that secures the world’s maritime commons. However, many thinkers now see China’s growing power, especially naval power, as a consequential challenge to the US-led liberal international order, and fear that this assault on US hegemony portends disorder. The return of the US president Donald Trump to the White House has of course accentuated these liberal fears, especially in the US but also among America’s allies, particularly its Western partners. The premise of HST, crafted by Americans at the height of the American century, however, is wrong. History shows us that there are other pathways to international order, and that stability does not require hegemony.

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Israel Must Reckon With What It Wrought in Gaza

Michael Gross in The New York Times:

In talks leading up to the cease-fire deal between Hamas and Israel, President Trump said he told Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, “You’re going to be remembered for this” — ending the war in Gaza — “far more than if you kept this thing going, going, going, kill, kill, kill.” Kill, kill, kill: With those words, Mr. Trump evoked the large-scale loss of life in two years of fighting. Not since the smiting days of the Old Testament have Jews killed as many people as we have killed in Gaza. The number is staggering and may reach 100,000 civilians and combatants when the rubble is cleared. This is not an accusation. It’s just the plain truth.

No matter how we explain, justify or name it, this fact remains, and it is one that Jews — whether they opposed or supported Israel’s conduct in the war — especially in Israel but also abroad, must reckon with if the Jewish community is ever to extricate itself from the trauma of this war, which began with the Oct. 7, 2023, attack by Hamas that left some 1,200 people in Israel dead. As a nation proud of its moral tradition, how do we do this?

More here.

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