by Dave Maier
Belief, as Aristotle might say, is said in many ways. This would be okay, except it can lead to some annoying, and I think avoidable, muddles. Here I try to pick a way through the minefield.
Let's jump right in. When I say
(1) I believe/don't believe in Bigfoot.
I express my view on whether the “footprints” are fake, the famous film clip is a hoax, etc. For the negative form at least, we might say instead
(1a) I don't believe that there is such a creature as Bigfoot is supposed to be.
This is a statement of the form “I don't believe that P”, where P is some proposition with a truth value. I would say this is true for the positive form as well, but it sounds funny to say
(1b) I believe that there is such a creature as Bigfoot is supposed to be.
even if that is in fact what you believe. In any case I will mostly use the positive and negative forms arbitrarily, unless the difference really seems relevant.
How about this one?
(2) I believe/don't believe in God.
Taken in one way, this sounds like (1). Its negative form can be paraphrased in the same way:
(2a) I don't believe that there is such a being as God is supposed to be.
The context for this reading of (2) might be a conversation in which we were trying to decide whether the force of moral principles derives from divine command. If there exists no divine being to issue these commands, then whatever force morality has cannot come from divine command.
But (2), unlike (1), can also be used to mean
(2b) I am a religious believer; in particular, an adherent of a monotheistic religion such as Christianity.
Here I don't simply assert the existence of some entity, but also indicate the nature of my attitude toward it, which amounts in this case to, among other things, an existential commitment to be a certain type of person. In fact (if I am not particularly orthodox) I may not care very much if “God” is taken to refer to an entity at all, existent or not.