by Daniel Ranard
"I am in the world and at the same time in myself: is there geometry more beautiful?"
—Abdelmajid Benjelloun
When someone learns you're in academia, sometimes they ask questions you're not qualified to answer. An economist friend was asked once: "Oh, so how long do eggs last in the fridge?" And so it is, perhaps, with asking physicists about consciousness. You may as well ask a philosopher, a neuroscientist, or really anyone else – after all, we all have first-hand knowledge of that spark of life inside our skulls.
But I want to write on what physicists think about consciousness. Not because they deserve special authority, but because they provide an important point of reference. The physicist's worldview usually contains some aspect of physicalism (asserting the only "real" things are physical things, governed by physical laws), reductionism (asserting all observable phenomena are explicable in terms of their microscopic parts), and positivism or operationalism (asserting that the only meaningful concepts are empirically testable). And in recent generations more than any others, it seems, this web of attitudes permeates the zeitgeist. It is our inheritance from the success of 20th-century physics.
This inheritance alters the way we frame questions about the mind and consciousness. While Descartes asked how the physical realm interacts with the realm of the mind and soul (his answer: the pineal gland), today we immediately privilege the physical. If the world consists only of the physical, how does the conscious mind arise? If your brain is a soup of electrons and protons, how does this soup come to harbor an interior experience? What gives rise to thoughts, feelings, and sense of being?
Philosophers have devised an intricate taxonomy of responses to the question of how consciousness relates to the physical world. Where do modern physicists fall within this taxonomy, especially as a community whose attitudes have historically shaped the framing of the question?