Grant Wong interviews Tejas Parasher in the Journal of the History of Ideas:
Grant Wong: In your article, you argue for a reading of twentieth-century Indian political thought that emphasizes conflict over consensus. You criticize the literature’s embrace of a “parliamentary reading” of anti-colonial constitutional thought that neglects its intellectual diversity. To do so, you juxtapose the ideas of M.N. Roy against those of his contemporaries: “Recovering Roy’s polemics against Indian nationalists… helps us move beyond viewing the democratic thought of India’s founding as a straightforward adoption of a British political model.” What do we miss when we neglect thinkers like Roy? What do we stand to gain by adopting your perspective?
Tejas Parasher: There has long been a tendency amongst political theorists to view the globalization of democracy in the twentieth century through a diffusionist lens. Since the mid-1940s, many have understood the formation of democratic republics in new, post-imperial countries in Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean as indicative of the appeal of the kinds of representative, electoral constitutional systems which prevailed in postwar Western Europe—British parliamentarism, French republicanism, and so on. This is the perspective we find outlined very clearly, for instance, in John Petrov Plamenatz’s On Alien Rule and Self-Government (1960), one of the first attempts by a political philosopher to examine the triangular relationship between democracy, empire, and nationalism. Plamenatz interprets the democratization of former imperial territories as an enthusiastic embrace of Western representative democracy by nationalist elites, a kind of ideological consummation of liberalism. India, as a particularly successful instance of post-imperial, democratic nation-building, occupies a central place in these narratives.
One of the main aims of my article is to highlight how the diffusionist historiography of democratization is based on a selective, partial understanding of anti-colonial nationalism. The narrative almost entirely elides those anti-colonial thinkers who were deeply apprehensive about representative government and liberal democracy as these regimes existed in the immediate aftermath of World War II.
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