by Akeel Bilgrami
Realism, it is said by philosophers, is the view that truth and reality is objective, i.e., independent of our mentality. But, of course, such a brief statement leaves things very intuitive and underdescribed. How should we understand it in detail?
The form of realism that I find most plausible is best elaborated in terms that are a combination of Kant's idea of ‘transcendental idealism' (without any commitment to the ‘ding an sich') and ‘pragmatism' of a rather specific kind that can be found in Charles Sanders Pierce's path-breaking paper, ‘The Fixation of Belief' and developed within a complex account of belief revision by Isaac Levi.
In being Kantian, it is a realism that renounces what Hilary Putnam has called ‘metaphysical realism' or what perhaps in an earlier time might have been called ‘transcendental realism'. And in being pragmatist, it renounces, a fallibilist, Cartesian epistemology.
Let me speak to its pragmatist side first.
Pragmatism, at its most general, says: Something that makes no difference to practice makes no difference to Philosophy. What is yielded when we apply this dictum more specifically to epistemological matters in Philosophy? It yields the following thought. A pragmatist epistemology claims that something that makes no difference to the cognitive practice of inquiry makes no difference to epistemology. And so it finds that a fallibilist form of doubt that is found in Cartesian skepticism makes no difference to inquiry and therefore is not a credible epistemology.
Thus let us take Cartesian skepticism about the external world. It claims both that all our beliefs about the external world could be false and that of any particular such belief, we could never be certain of its truth. These are two distinct claims since the latter does not entail the former. It is the latter claim that pragmatism opposes. The basis of its opposition is that if we can never know of any given belief about the world that it is true, then truth cannot be a goal of inquiry. It makes no good sense to say that truth is a goal of inquiry even though we are never sure in any given case that we have achieved the goal. That would mean inquiry would be like sending a message in a bottle out to sea. What kind of epistemological enterprise is that? We would never have any control over its success, and all success would appear to be a sort of bonus or fluke.
