Shelby Bradford in The Scientist:
Viraj Muthye is a bioinformatician at Alberta Precision Laboratories and the cofounder of the Creative Science Alliance. Whether he is crunching data or communicating science, his goal is to tell a good story. For him, a big part of science storytelling is having the right visuals. From the lab to the broader community, Muthye uses artistic principles to translate complex science into meaningful insights through data visualization.
Why is data visualization important in research?
I believe that visualizations translate data into a story. When I took a Google course on data analytics, I realized how much of a gap there was between bioinformaticians—who often have a lot of data but focus mostly on just showing the outcomes—and data analysts—who think much more about communicating the information to an audience. I learned a lot of ways to actually visualize data, which I now use to create websites for researchers who don’t have a bioinformatics background and would struggle to interpret their data otherwise.
More here.
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It’s the very smallest things in a work of art that draw us in and seize us, that stick in the memory, call us back, make us feel that this is a masterpiece, which is only a way of saying it’s a thing that we love beyond measure.
After eleven years of sobriety are followed by a year of secret drinking, Meghan O’Gieblyn copies a line from Simone Weil on an index card and tapes it above her desk: “We have to try to cure our faults by attention and not by will.” This mantra launches an extraordinary memoir that is as much philosophical and theological exploration as it is a narrative of personal struggle. Maybe the most remarkable thing about Will and Attention, in fact, is that psychological and emotional resolution do not seem possible at all for O’Gieblyn without some kind of accompanying philosophical breakthrough. To borrow an image of her own, this book is a winding sermon, not a triumphant TED Talk.
A long time ago, in the far-off 1990s, a mentor warned me that the subject I’d proposed to study, the Victorian novel, was fast approaching its expiration date. Soon enough, he said, its eye-straining bulk would set behind the horizon of cultural memory, following its 18th-century predecessors into antiquarian darkness. It was partly a numbers game, he explained: when the odometer clicked over and the 20th century squatted between the Victorians and us, they would become the-thing-before-the-thing-before, distant and inscrutable. Likewise, not so very long afterwards, the novel itself would probably go, as the elaborate economic and technological apparatus that had kept it going – the printed book, high levels of mass literacy, the not-yet-wholly-captured leisure time of industrial and post-industrial life – would come apart.
Matthew Adelstein is one of a small group of new public philosophers—a handful of young thinkers doing and perhaps performing philosophy in the public square on various social media platforms. This group is distinctive because, in addition to their status as influencers, they occupy roles within the profession of academic philosophy as graduate students in Princeton’s doctoral program in philosophy. Writing under the name “Bentham’s Bulldog,” Adelstein recently provoked a great deal of attention with a viral Substack article arguing that in sufficiently large aggregates,
By analysing and comparing the genomes of 163 ant species from 12 of the 16 ant subfamilies living today, the researchers were able to reconstruct the
Recent advances in agentic Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems have marked a shift in AI for Science: moving away from the use of individual AI systems for narrow task execution, toward multi-agent systems capable of orchestrating complex, end-to-end research workflows and performing (semi-)autonomous scientific discovery. The development of multi-agent AI-for-science systems has primarily focused on improving the cognitive capabilities of AI systems, specifically by making advanced reasoning and hypothesis generation more reliable. However, focusing only on cognitive capability improvement could ignore appropriate management of resources, a key bottleneck in scientific discovery. Testing and validating scientific hypotheses and experiments is, physically and economically, resource-intensive and resources are limited. This means that to make significant advancements in autonomous scientific discovery, such as improving human-AI co-scientist complementarity or reaching a truly closed-loop automated process, we must pair ongoing improvements in reasoning capabilities with robust resource management. In this paper, we outline an infrastructure for AI resource management by developing the necessary foundations of scientific agent economies, markets, and institutions. The aim of this infrastructure is to empower AI agents and human scientists to effectively (i) collaborate and establish research priorities, (ii) assign credit, (iii) track accountability and liability, and (iv) safeguard against malicious use and information security risks. Finally, we engage with the macro-level societal implications. of (semi-)autonomous scientific discovery to inform the development of governance policies ensuring an equitable distribution of AI-driven discoveries and derivative future technologies.
There’s barely been a moment in the last half-century when David Byrne hasn’t been zinging about, dancing forward, opting odd. The art-school dropout frontman of
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The brain spends about half of its
Rather than see expressions like these as merely rhetorical, many philosophers and psychologists argue that moral disgust is a distinct and significant kind of moral response. The distinction between moral disgust and regular
I
After being on many scientists’ shortlists for years,