by Melanie Friedrichs
The Icarus Factor: Interpreting Financial Crisis through the Capacity-Output Cross
In finance, the “Icarus factor” describes the dangerous over-excitement that leads company managers to take on projects too risky or too ambitious for the company to handle. But can the story of Icarus apply to a bigger picture? Perhaps the economy is like a company; it can only handle so much real estate speculation, so many collateralized debt obligations, so much easy credit before it begins to get uncomfortably hot.
A Short Summary of The Capacity-Output Cross
Two weeks ago I introduced the “capacity-output cross,” a new way to conceptualize the causal role of money and finance that came from thinking about how classical theorists—Adam Smith, David Hume, John Maynard Keynes, F.A. Hayek, Milton Friedman—differ in their interpretations of the equation of exchange, MV = PQ. I renamed Q real output proposed a new term: capacity for exchange, roughly equal to M times potential V determined by the state of financial innovation and the strength of institutions. Neither quantity is measurable, but real output can be imagined as utility value of all goods and services produced during a given period of time, and capacity for exchange can be imagined as the amount of money available to be spent during a given period of time, recognizing that within that in any given period some dollars will be spent more than once.
I sketched economic history with the two lines. Capacity crosses Real Output, because it is usually easier to mine or print money or to improve institutions than it is to increase the efficiency of production and make more real value. The lines cross at different times in different markets and in different places, but as an example I suggested that the economy of northern Europe “crossed” during the expansion of coinage and banking during the 18th century, sometime around the time of Hume and Smith.
