by Daniel Gauss
Metaphorically, if hippo ethics is the impulse to respond to suffering with compassion, hyena ethics is the impulse to enjoy, justify or morally authorize suffering.
Harm toward another person has been morally justified when it is an act of deterrence and this is, in fact, a rationale for legal punishment. By punishing individual wrong doers, we feel we can reduce the degree of harmful behavior in our society as others may be restrained from similar behavior if they know punishment will follow. We feel that limited harm may prevent greater harm, and it is harm inflicted out of necessity, not out of glee.
There is, however, another type of harm which is much darker and more sinister. It is harm we inflict because it gives us a sense of personal satisfaction and even pleasure, and it is often confused with moral action. This type of harm is so commonplace that it is often not questioned or challenged. It is at the core of much unnecessary human suffering on a personal, societal and international scale.
It is the harm we cause because we feel the other “deserves” it purely because the person is different from us, has upset us and/or we simply enjoy the idea of harming them because we no longer see that person as a human being deserving of our respect or kindness.
What makes this act of harm so insidious is that many of us do not even recognize the irrational impulse behind it, because, in part, it is couched in neuro-chemicals that “hide” it from our moral investigation and make it seem unquestioningly right. It is harm which is morally wrong but which feels right to us. We harm others thinking we have every right to, when, upon closer inspection, we do not. We want to hurt the person we consider to be a bad guy, but it turns out that we are the bad guy. Read more »
Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations begins with this claim:
I just read Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations for the first time. Not every word. It’s over a thousand pages, and there are long “Digressions” (Smith’s term) on matters such as the history of the value of silver, or banking in Amsterdam, which I simply passed over. I was mainly interested in what Smith has to say about work, so I also merely skimmed some other sections that seemed to have little relevance to my research. Time and again, though, I found myself getting sucked into chapters unrelated to my concerns simply because the topics discussed are so interesting, and what Smith has to say is so thought-provoking. Reading the book is also made easier both by Smith’s admirably lucid writing and by the brief summaries of the main claims being made that he inserts throughout at the left-hand margin.