by Muhammad Aurangzeb Ahmad
The arrival of DeepSeek’s large language model sent shockwaves through Silicon Valley, signaling that—for the first time—a Chinese AI company might rival its American counterparts in technological sophistication. Some researchers even suggest that the loosening of AI regulation in the West is, in part, a response to the competitive pressure DeepSeek has created. One need not invoke Terminator-style doomsday scenarios to recognize how AI is already exacerbating real-world issues, such as racial profiling in facial recognition systems and exacerbating health inequities. While concerns about responsible AI development arise globally, the Western and Chinese approaches to AI governance diverge in subtle but significant ways. Comparative studies of Chinese and European AI guidelines have shown near-identical lists of ethical concerns—transparency, fairness, accountability—but scholars argue that these shared terms often mask philosophical differences. In the context of pluralistic ethics, Confucian ethics offers a valuable perspective by foregrounding relational responsibility, moral self-cultivation, and social harmony—complementing and enriching dominant individualistic and utilitarian frameworks in global AI ethics. In Geography of Thought Nisbett argues that moral reasoning is approached differently in Eastern societies, where context, relationships, and collective well-being are emphasized.
To illustrate such differences, consider fairness. In East Asian contexts may be interpreted relationally – focused on harmony and social roles rather than procedurally. This suggests that AI systems evaluated as “fair” in the Western context may be perceived as unjust or inappropriate in another cultural settings. Similarly, privacy in the Western context is rooted in individual autonomy, rights, and personal boundaries. It could even be framed as a negative liberty i.e., the right to be left alone. Thus, Western approaches to privacy in AI (like GDPR) emphasize explicit consent, control over personal data, and transparency, often through individual-centric legal frameworks. In contrast, Confucian ethics views the self as relational and embedded in social roles—not as an isolated, autonomous unit. Privacy, therefore, is not an absolute right but a context-dependent value balanced with responsibilities to family, community, and social harmony. From a Confucian perspective, the ethical use of personal data might depend more on the intent, relational trust, and social benefit, rather than solely on individual consent or formal rights. If data use contributes to collective well-being or aligns with relational obligations, it may be seen as ethically acceptable—even in cases where Western frameworks would call it a privacy violation.
Consider elder care robots: a Confucian ethicist might ask whether such systems can genuinely reinforce familial bonds and facilitate emotionally meaningful interactions—such as encouraging virtual family visits or supporting the sharing of life stories. While Western ethical frameworks may also address these concerns, they often place greater emphasis on individual autonomy and the protection of privacy. In contrast, a Confucian approach would center on whether the AI fosters relational obligations and emotional reciprocity, thereby fulfilling moral duties that extend beyond the individual to the family and broader community. Other Confucian thinkers argue that while AI robots can assist with care needs, they lack genuine emotional capacity and relational depth, making them inadequate substitutes for human caregivers from a Confucian perspective. Nonetheless, robotic eldercare may be ethically permissible within certain limits, and its increasing presence will inevitably reshape our understanding of relationships and filial duty.
Scholars like Sor-Hoon Tan have argued that the absence of genuine human relationality and interpersonal interaction is a fundamental limitation of the current AI technology. Thus, even though one could build a system that mimics virtue, without authentic relational engagement, it would merely be transactional in nature. Consequently, such a system would fall short of embodying the ideal Confucian moral agent. The development of a socially situated virtuous robot is not an exclusively Confucian pejorative, there are examples of such proposals in the Western context as well. However, in the Confucian context, cultivating relationality and encouraging interpersonal interactions is central vs. secondary in the Western context. Some scholars have even argued that Western ethics often rely on top-down, rule-based approaches when it comes to AI. These approaches may thus be limited in handling complex, context-sensitive ethical scenarios. In contrast, Confucian ethics embody a bottom-up, virtue-based approach, emphasizing role-specific obligations, emotional intelligence, and continuous moral learning. This framework is especially suited for social and assistive robots.
Another area of growing philosophical debate concerns whether AI-powered bots should be granted rights. In Western discourse, much of the discussion revolves around the possibility of conferring personhood to robots. While some AI systems—particularly large language models—can now pass the Turing Test, many remain hesitant to assign personhood due to their lack of genuine agency, consciousness, or moral accountability. At first glance, the idea of granting personhood to a non-human, non-sentient entity may seem absurd. Yet, precedents exist: for example, corporations in American society are treated as legal persons and are afforded certain rights. If we adopt a functionalist perspective—the view that anything that behaves like a human should be treated as one—we open the door to a host of ethical dilemmas, challenging our assumptions about rights, responsibilities, and what it truly means to be a moral agent. An elegant solution to this dilemma, proposed by Tae Wan Kim, from a Confucian sidesteps the whole debate. He argues that functionalism ignores the relational and ritual foundations of morality emphasized in Confucian ethics. While robots may simulate human-like behavior, they lack genuine consciousness, emotional depth, and the capacity for moral responsibility. Granting them rights based solely on function risks diluting the meaning of moral agency and overlooks the importance of rituals in cultivating virtue and social harmony. Instead of rights, Kim suggests rethinking robot integration through the lens of rites, asking whether their presence supports human moral development. In Kim’s words, “moral agents as bearers of rites, not rights.”
An adjacent issue is the problem of griefbots—AI-driven chatbots designed to emulate deceased individuals has elicited different responses across cultural landscapes. Critics argue that interacting with digital replicas of the deceased might blur the lines between reality and simulation, potentially hindering the natural grieving process and leading to unhealthy attachments. There are also apprehensions about the commercialization of grief and the exploitation of personal data associated with such technologies. Chinese perspectives, rooted in Confucian and Daoist philosophy, offer an alternative approach to griefbots. Talking from a Daoist perspective, Pengbo Liu posits that griefbots facilitate the mourner’s journey through grief as a process of transformation and acceptance, rather than clinging to an unchanging past. Intended to help the bereaved adapt to their loss by evolving the nature of the relationship, encouraging acceptance and personal growth. Although I had been engaging with and writing about griefbots for nearly a decade, encountering the Chinese perspective prompted a profound reassessment of my assumptions and approach to the issue.
There is often a temptation to view Confucian ethics narrowly—as a philosophical system confined to East or Southeast Asia, centered primarily around China and its neighboring cultures. However, this regional framing overlooks the universal moral insights and global potential embedded within Confucian thought. Just as Christianity and Islam—though originating in the Middle East—have evolved into global religions with diverse cultural expressions, and just as Liberalism and Marxism, both Western in origin, have become powerful global ideologies shaping political systems and social movements worldwide, Confucianism too should be understood as a global philosophy rather than a culturally bounded tradition. Confucianism offers a rich framework of relational ethics, virtue cultivation, ritual practice, and communal harmony, which resonates across cultures and can inform contemporary global issues such as ethics in technology, environmental responsibility, education, and governance. Two primary examples of this Confucianism’s appeal as a global philosophy are Boston Confucianism and Islamic Confucianism. Including Confucianism in global discourse on AI ethics challenges dominant individualistic and utilitarian frameworks by emphasizing context-sensitive moral judgment, human flourishing, and the importance of trustworthy, socially embedded AI systems.