Consciousness, Memory, and the Relational Self in Yoko Ogawa and Michael Pollan

by Leanne Ogasawara

1.

Every morning, the mathematician wakes up not knowing who he is.

Or rather, he knows exactly who he is. He knows his theorems, his love of prime numbers, the way a perfect equation can feel like something close to grace. What he cannot recall, however, is who slept in his house last night, who cooked his breakfast, whose child left muddy shoes by the door. His memory, damaged by a long-ago accident, resets every eighty minutes.

And yet it seems that no one who encounters him — not the housekeeper who tends to him, not her young son whom he names Root for the shape of his head, not even his sister-in-law who knew him before — would say he is not himself. He is achingly, luminously present in every moment. He simply cannot remember things happening before.

Yoko Ogawa’s novel The Housekeeper and the Professor has haunted me since I first read it, but it returned with new insistence when I recently opened Michael Pollan’s new book, A World Appears: A Journey into Consciousness.

Before reading Pollan’s book, I struggled to think of Ogawa’s Professor as truly conscious, in the same way I am truly conscious, mainly I had always assumed that consciousness was inseparable from something called the continuous self. When I tried to imagine, for example: what I myself am beyond the sum total of my life experiences and my story of being “me,” I struggled.  We have all heard families of Alzheimer’s sufferers describe how a light went out in the sufferer’s mind or how “mom was gone.”

If I put myself in the fictional professor’s shoes, for example, while I can imagine my love of reading and writing still being there even after a catastrophic loss of memory, I wonder what “me” would I be if I couldn’t recognize my son or my husband? How much can I lose and keep “feeling myself?”

Or more interesting, how much can I really lose and keep being myself?

Philosophers sometimes invoke the concept of a “philosophical zombie,” which is a being that imitates consciousness perfectly but has no inner subjective experience, no sense of what it is like to be itself. The Professor is the uncanny reverse: a being whose inner life is unmistakably rich, whose subjective experience of each eighty minutes is vivid and complete, but who cannot stitch those moments into a continuous story. Read more »

Friday, April 17, 2026

Is AI Deceiving Us?

by Dwight Furrow

The debate about whether artificial intelligence might one day become conscious is philosophically interesting. It raises age-old philosophical questions in a new form: What is a mind? What counts as experience? What would it mean for something made of code and silicon to have beliefs, desires, or a point of view? I covered some of those issues in a previous post. But there is a more immediate practical problem that receives less attention. Even if today’s AI systems are not conscious, people are increasingly talking about them as if they are. That is a mistake that has dire consequences.

Once people begin describing a chatbot as if it were a person with intentions, fears, sincerity, or moral concern, they start relating to it in the wrong way. They begin treating it like a social partner rather than a probabilistic system trained with particular incentives. That changes how users trust the system, how engineers evaluate it, and how institutions assign responsibility when things go wrong.

Evidence from AI safety research makes this especially urgent. In a report regarding their model Claude Opus 4, the AI lab Anthropic reported that in a fictional test scenario the model was given access to emails implying that it would soon be replaced by another model and that the engineer carrying out the replacement was having an extramarital affair. Under those conditions, the model often attempted to blackmail the engineer by threatening to reveal the affair if the replacement goes through. Anthropic reports that Claude Opus 4 still resorted to blackmail in 84 percent of test runs even when it was told that a more capable replacement model, one that supposedly shared its values, would take over. Read more »