by Laurence Peterson
I am writing this on Sunday afternoon, the 29th of September, 2024. The Guardian (UK version) informs me that the Israel Defense Force (IDF) have confirmed that dozens of Israeli aircraft are attacking what they say to be “military targets belonging to the Houthi terrorist regime” in Yemen, and may be preparing for a ground invasion of Lebanon. This is after a week of bombing in Lebanon that has resulted in at least 650 deaths (500 in one day, about a third of the number slaughtered on October the 7th of last year) and the assassination of the leader of Hezbollah, a major political party in Lebanon that has deep roots in the wider Lebanese society. Israel also assassinated a number of other key members of Hezbollah, as well as a senior Iranian official in Lebanon. And this after the remote detonation of pagers and other hand-held devices attached to bombs by Israel that killed maybe a score of people, but wounded thousands, and set much of the country into panic at the thought that any nearby electronic device might blow up and kill or seriously maim simple bystanders. And all this after months of unprecedented carnage and destruction in Gaza and the West Bank.
Not long ago, the incidence of one of these events, or maybe two concurrently, would be enough for me to become very concerned about the possibility of the outbreak of wider war that might just cascade into some kind of confrontation between powers possessing nuclear weapons. Now, though I firmly believe the international situation is as grave as any I have lived through in my 63 years on planet Earth, the constant succession and routinization of these kinds of events these days is taking a kind of toll on me: I am coming, emotionally speaking, to expect that these kinds of happenings that seem to demand immediate and thorough resolution to any sane person will simply pile up, like the bodies of the victims of the tragedies associated with those events. Maybe this is a kind of defense mechanism, like a sort of geopolitical learned-helplessness. Whatever it is, it is disconcerting, disorienting and highly disagreeable.
But I have not even spoken yet of Russia/Ukraine or China. Regarding Ukraine, just last week, as the attempted Ukrainian counter-offensive in the Kursk region continued to founder, and the Russians made gains in the east, President Zelensky came to the United States, met with President Biden, Vice-President and presidential candidate Harris and presidential candidate Trump. He proclaimed he was in possession of a “victory strategy”, strange from a man who has seen 30% of his country vanish. But he is returning home with $8 billion in further US aid (Israel also got $8.7 billion last week). Meanwhile, President Putin of Russia was busy changing Russia’s nuclear doctrine, which defines the conditions under which Russia could commit to nuclear war: naturally, with the Ukrainians hailing ultimate victory, this amounts to a loosening of parameters, and states that Russia would regard an attack by a non-nuclear state (Poland, Romania, etc., Eastern European countries highly antagonistic to Russia) allied with a nuclear state (US, UK and France) as sufficient to opt for a nuclear response.
Where China is concerned, last week also saw United States Typhon missiles based in the Philippines being pointed at China. The last few months have featured much contention between the United States and China over Taiwan, and the pointing of missiles directly at China can only increase the tension considerably. Meanwhile, constant trade disputes and threats, as well as further imposition of US sanctions (30% of the nations in the world are under US sanctions, and a whopping 60% of the poorer nations of the earth) constitute immense problems that fester underneath at this very unstable point in US-China relations.
Right now, then, the world simultaneously faces exceptionally high levels of instability and violence or potential violence in not one, but three different theaters featuring nuclear powers on one or both sides: Israel/Iran, Russia/Ukraine and China/US. I do not believe such a situation has ever existed. Diplomatic attempts to lower tensions, never mind resolve the underlying conflicts, are pretty much nonexistent, if not simply dismissed out of hand, or even actively stalled by the conflicting powers. The sole superpower, the United States, does nothing to reduce tensions. It actively supports Israel and Ukraine, and antagonizes China. In fact, a remarkable, and almost completely ignored investigation by ProPublica revealed that Israel deliberately blocked desperately needed aid to benighted Gaza, as determined by two separate US government agencies working directly under Secretary of State Blinken. US law states that US weapons sales must be halted if the recipient country is found to be preventing delivery of US-backed food, medicine and other kinds of aid. Blinken ignored the findings and told Congress that Israel was not preventing delivery of aid. Blinken essentially lied to Congress while directing policy that contravened US law. Such is the state of diplomacy in these deeply distressed days.
Where will things go from here? It is hard to imagine how Iran can continue to exercise the restraint it has shown over the past year. It has seen its senior leaders assassinated by Israel; its vital allies in Lebanon and now Yemen are being bombed intensely; its supreme leader is in hiding due to the threat of assassination by Israel or one of its agents; and the threat of land invasions looms over the region. I can only hope that some kind of incentives are being dangled in front of the Iranians regarding lifting of sanctions. The United States has sent 50,000 troops to the region; will it get involved? Hezbollah is being decimated; will it not respond forcefully at some point, making it even harder for Iran to stay out? The next few days may provide potentially ominous answers to these questions.
In Ukraine it will soon be winter, and much of the fighting will cease until the snows, rain and mud recede in the spring. There are whispers regarding negotiations to bring an end to hostilities, but these do not mesh well with talk of allowing Ukraine to use missiles provided by allies that would strike Russian assets deep within Russia itself. The possibility of a fourth year of war seems likely. This continuing stalemate will, in turn, affect, adversely in all likelihood, Russia’s ability to respond to other global emergencies.
China and the United States will continue to clash about China’s growing presence in the Indo-Pacific region, as well Taiwan, trade and China’s industrial development. Progress on any of these issues looks like a very remote possibility. Ultimately, then, we have one region basically in flames already, and smoldering tensions in the other two that could become intertwined with the first somehow. And all of them contain at least one nuclear-armed power. It is really, really difficult to envision how all this ends up. I think the only thing we can be sure of is a whole lot of dead bodies.
Enjoying the content on 3QD? Help keep us going by donating now.