Critique of Pure Mindlessness

Nicholas Heron in the Sydney Review of Books:

In the 1969 postscript to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn distinguished two different senses in which ‘paradigm’, the technical term his book popularised, had been used. On the one hand, a paradigm denoted the ‘entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community’. In this first sense, paradigm was employed sociologically, an application Kuhn regretted in retrospect. ‘Disciplinary matrix’ became his preferred locution for the shared commitments defining a specific scientific community.

On the other hand (and in a stricter sense), paradigm denoted only one element in that constellation: a model or an example that could ‘replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science’. In this second, ‘deeper’ understanding of the term, paradigms were equated with the concrete problem-solutions (the example Kuhn gives is Newton’s Second Law of Motion, typically written f = ma) enshrined in a scientific community’s textbooks, lectures and laboratory exercises that scientists learned to apply in their research.

More here.