Tag: Liminality

The Pharisees’ Fence: Misplaced Concreteness And Liminal Unease

Posted on by Jochen Szangolies

by Jochen Szangolies

Image credit: Randy Fath on Unsplash

When asked about the foundational technologies of human civilization, most people will probably point to the wheel, or fire, or maybe the lever. Perhaps the atlatl as arguably humanity’s first machine might make the cut. Few, I think, would point to the humble fence: rather than being a construct, fences often seem to us merely a recognition of divides already present, and thus, hardly a separate technology on their own. The land is divided according to ownership, and the fences erected upon it merely mark this preexisting reality.

In truth, fences, both physical and metaphorical, fulfill an important role in the transition from a natural, unmodified, technology-free world to a reality structured according to human design. Their prevalence in metaphor is evidence of this: you can sit on them, tear them down, they are in our heads, the grass is greener on their far side, good ones allegedly make good neighbors, you can mend them, or swing for them in an attempt to achieve your most far-out performance.

The primary role of the fence is that of demarcation. Put on an originally pristine plain, it divides it into a ‘here’ and a ‘there’. Interpreting each side in terms of possession, it distinguishes between ‘mine’ and ‘theirs’; in terms of identity, it separates ‘us’ from ‘them’. It takes a continuum of possibilities and replaces it with a sharp distinction. As such, it is the original digital technology.

(Parenthetically, fences are also the original capitalist technology: not just in defining the notion of ownership, but through the concept of enclosure, the appropriation of common land that was worked by all, to be rented back to its original cultivators.)

Fences are the ultimate expression of the human tendency to categorize, to parcel off, to structure. They are a quintessentially lobsterian creation: as its hard carapace rigidly shields its vulnerable interior from a dangerous environment, so does the fence protect the shepherd’s flock from the roaming wolf. As the lobster’s analytic claw dissects whatever catches its attention, so do fences slice the land into discrete plots.

There is no question of the usefulness of fences. But the impulse to dissect, to rein in, and to replace vague continua with clear boundaries can all too easily result in a misplaced concreteness where real ambiguity exists, and in hard dichotomies where the reality is one of continuity across perceived differences. Read more »

Monday, April 5, 2021

An Existential Void: Liminality As Transition Between Rule-Spaces

Posted on by Jochen Szangolies

by Jochen Szangolies

Figure 1: A chess board, depicting the scholar’s mate.

Even if you’ve never played chess in your life, the image in Fig. 1 is probably readily identifiable to you. The regular grid of the chessboard, white and black standing in opposition, perhaps even the individual pieces—knights, pawns, bishops, and so on—are a cultural staple.

If you have some familiarity with the rules of chess, however, you will see more than that: rather than a mere configuration of items, you’ll see moves—options, dangers, strategies. For instance, the white queen is threatened by the knight on f6: a knight always moves in a specific way, one step diagonally, one step straight, allowing it to move to the white queen’s spot to capture. To evade, the white queen could capture the black pawn on e5—but then, would be captured by the knight on c6. A much better option—the move this particular configuration of pieces seems to scream out to you, if you’re a chess player with some experience—is for the white queen to move to f7, capturing the pawn, for check and mate: the so-called ‘Scholar’s Mate’.

Familiarity with the rules of chess adds a semantic dimension to the chessboard. The pieces acquire a particular, individual character: the knight is that particular piece that moves one straight and one diagonal; the bishop is the piece that moves diagonally; and so on. Rules transform the chess pieces from inert physical objects to something with a particular identity, something almost agent-like, capable of acting towards a certain goal. However, removed from the chessboard, they loose this character: a bishop and a rook, connected at their bases, make for a passable model rocket ship, for example.

Indeed, in a pinch, you could easily take a chess pawn to replace one of the tokens in a game of Ludo, or Halma—there, despite its somewhat odd looks, it will nevertheless fit right in, given a new identity by a new set of rules.

The chess-, Ludo-, and Halma-boards are examples of rule spaces. Read more »