Kyla Bruff at Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews:
Questions concerning the differences between Schelling’s and Hegel’s philosophical systems have always been of intense interest. This has been the case since Hegel decisively ended their friendship and collaboration by critically describing the early Schelling’s concept of the Absolute (the identity of identity and non-identity, or A=A [Dews, 75–76]) as the night “in which all cows are black” in the Phenomenology of Spirit in 1807 (Hegel 1977, 9, cf. Dews 75). Schelling’s Absolute, on Hegel’s account, was an abyss of darkness within which the dynamic development of real difference did not emerge. In contrast, Hegel thought his own dialectical system could lift difference out of the night, capturing the “reality of the finite” and the dynamic process of becoming (77). While Schelling quickly moved on from the “Identity System” in question, Hegel nevertheless remained an inescapable shadow haunting Schelling’s philosophical career.
After Hegel’s death in 1831, Schelling publicly criticized him on numerous occasions, most notably in Berlin, where he took up Hegel’s chair in 1841 to expel “the dragon-seed of Hegelian pantheism” from Prussia (Matthews 2012, 6). The late Schelling, foreshadowing Kierkegaard, saw Hegel as unable to philosophically ground his own system, and accused him of employing circular reasoning when attempting to describe the beginning of pure being in thinking (132, 191).
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