Is AI changing the Character of War, its Nature, or Neither of the two?

by O. Del Fabbro

In recent public debates it has been argued that the implementation of Artificial Intelligence in weapons systems is changing the nature of war, or the character of war, or both. In what follows, my intention is to clarify these two concepts of nature of war and character. It will show that AI is a powerful technology, but it is currently neither changing the character nor the nature of war.

Nature of War, Character of War

In order to make sense of the difference between the nature of war and character of war, it is worthwhile to go back to the philosophy of war of the Prussian commander Carl von Clausewitz, who has systematically introduced that distinction.

Let’s start with the easier one. When referring to the character of war, one speaks of the accidental and concrete conflicts that emerge in the history of mankind and that we usually point at, when we talk about wars: World War I and II, the Napoleonic Wars, the Thirty Years’ War, the Peloponnesian War, the ongoing Israel-Hamas war and the Ukraine-Russia war. The character of war is contingent, concrete and historical.

The nature of war is theoretically more complex. Clausewitz also calls the nature of war the spirit (Geist) or concept (Begriff) of war. The nature of war is war’s essence. That is, the nature of war is on a conceptual and abstract level, and not war’s manifestation in reality. Three major aspects or principles of the nature of war are highlighted by Clausewitz. First, war is a duel between two parties. Clausewitz uses the image of two wrestlers trying to subdue each other by forcing their will upon one another. War is thus the physical coercion of the opponent, or his destruction. War is violent, it is filled with hatred and animosity, it is a blind natural drive. War is fought by a people or a state. Second, war is politics by other means, that is, war is not a self-sufficient system, isolated from other realms of reality. War is an instrument of politics. Third, war is like a game (actually a game of cards), that is, war is about chance and probability. War is guided by commanders, who need talent and courage in order to subdue the enemy. All in all, these three pillars of war are what Clausewitz calls the trinity of the nature of war.

It is absolutely crucial to understand that both, the character and nature of war, have a dialectical relationship, that is, they influence each other. That’s why one cannot talk about the character of war, without mentioning the nature of war, and vice versa. In this sense, the distinction is also a heuristic tool. It helps to understand for example, if indeed there has been a change in the character or the nature of war.

An example for Clausewitz of the change in the character of war is the levée en masse used by Napoleon. Because of the rise of the democratic citizen, Napoleon was able to conscript thousands, even millions of men, to fight in his brutal wars across Europe and achieve major successes – at least at first, until his opponents copied his art of fighting. Nevertheless, because every state adapted to this new way of warfare, the character of war was changed. But even though the character of war had changed, the threefold aspect, its nature, did not disappear, namely: duel, politics and game. The concepts themselves did not change, on the contrary, the changing character of war actually manifested them.

The Role of Technology

The desire to fight leads to invention and innovation for Clausewitz. The aim of war is to win, and in order to win, better technology is advantageous. Invention is first and foremost linked to weapon systems and equipment, which is guided by the arts and the sciences. They are, just as conscription and training, part of warfare or conduct of war (Kriegsführung). Conduct of war in turn is the arrangement and guidance of battle or fighting (Kampf). And fighting in turn consists of many different smaller combats (Gefecht). Arrangement and guidance of combats is tactics, and tactics taken all together in order to fulfill an aim in war is strategy.

It is possible that battle changes due to inventions, but the concept or nature of battle is not changing. This is why weapon systems and equipment are not an essential part of fighting or combat. Wrestling for example is fighting without weapons and equipment. This is important. Weapons and equipment have the potential to change battle and fighting, but they do not change war. Technology arms the violent nature of war, that’s it.

Hence, fighting fosters new inventions in order to be able to fight better and stronger, and inventions in turn might change fighting, but the nature of war, that is fighting, is not changed. Technology is thus not capable of changing the nature of war, but it can change the character of war. Successful inventions change how we fight.

AI and the Changing Character of War

AI would be part of science and the arts for Clausewitz. That is, AI is an invention of a new technology that helps the commander in the conduct of war. But has AI indeed changed the character of war? My answer is no.

When the IDF is using AI powered databases, called Lavender and Gospel, in order to identify potential human targets or buildings and infrastructure, for example private homes suspected of being used by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad operatives, then AI – used as an identification and recommendation technology – does not change how fighting happens. The same counts for any autonomous weapon system, such as drones used by the Ukrainians in order to hit Russian targets and vice versa. Or similarly, if Russian intelligence services use Generative AI to spread disinformation, and non-state terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State use deep fakes to spread propaganda.

In all these examples, AI enhances and augments already existing technologies, making them more efficient and powerful. It makes artillery and air force bombing more efficient, it allows drones to become more resistant against electronic warfare, it is able to spread disinformation more rapidly and in a targeted fashion. AI is an all-purpose technology in the sense that it can be used in many different objects and in different tactical settings for strategic purposes: army, navy and air force for conventional warfare, disinformation and propaganda in hybrid warfare, drones in asymmetrical and irregular warfare, but AI is currently not changing the character of war. Rather it is integrated and enveloped in already existing types of warfare, or conducts of war. In Clausewitz’ words: AI operates on the tactical level, but on this level, it does not bring any major changes. For example: drones indeed make the battlefield in Ukraine transparent, forcing soldiers to hide in their trenches. But this was not any different in World War I. The same counts for Urban warfare in the Gaza strip. AI does not bring along a new form or character of warfare. If there is not a major change on the tactical level of conducting warfare, then there is also no change on the higher strategic level that reaches all the way up to the commanders in chief, who are defining the war’s aims – which would be the pillar of game and also politics.

If this is true, then the statement that AI is currently changing the nature of war, does not even have to be discussed. For if the character of war is not changing, then most certainly AI is not reaching as deep as the nature of war. That is to say, none of the three pillars (duel, politics, game) are radically changing, for example by being replaced by another concept.

Singularity Battlefield

Many proponents of the belief that AI is changing the character or nature of war are arguing that the future will bring a major shift. That today’s implementation of AI is nothing but a foretaste of tomorrow’s warfare.

Often the notion of singularity battlefield or hyper war is then dropped. In such a scenario, the human brain will not be able to handle the fastness of the ever changing battlefield situation. Intelligent machines would have to take over the whole decision process, because swarms and fast computing machines will wage war.

For Clausewitz this makes no sense. The fog of war is already a reality, and yet, commanders do not hand over decision making processes to machines. Certainly, they use AI powered machines to guide decision making – already since the 1990s with programs such as DART to solve logistical problems for the First Iraq War –, but that does not mean that decision making is handed over completely. The human-in-the-loop is an important factor for the military.

If singularity battlefield, however, means the way Ray Kurzweil & Co. define it, namely that humans and machines are merging into one singular ontological entity, then the whole concept of war will become futile. War is a human endeavor, and if humans stop to exist, because they merge with technology, in order to become transhuman, then war becomes something else. It is no longer war. At this point, perhaps the nature of war has indeed changed, but to still call it war, has lost its meaning.

Potentially one day, with further advancement, AI might be able to change the nature of war, let it first however, get to the point, where it changes the character of war.

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