Affirming the Consequent? Modus Ponendo Ponens? Or Something Else?: The Controversy Around MIMS “This is Why I’m Hot”

Via Sean Carroll, does MIMS’s “This is Why I’m Hot” affirm the consequent? 

Matthew Yglesias:

In particular, he [Nyhan] thinks “I’m hot ’cause I’m fly / You ain’t [hot] ’cause you’re not [fly]” is an example of the fallacy. I disagree. Nyhan’s reading depends on construing MIMS as trying to make a logical inference with “’cause” as a material conditional but there’s no need to do that. Interpretive charity suggest that we should understand MIMS to be making two logically independent causal claims: (1) he’s hot because he’s fly and (2) you’re not hot because you’re not fly. Perhaps MIMS believes that x is hot if and only if x is fly, or perhaps he doesn’t. I don’t, however, see a fallacy here.

Rob Harvilla provides a breakdown in The Village Voice:

If you find completely overlapping Venn diagrams visually unhelpful, consider this tautology:

If that’s a bit pretentious, then maybe a blunt flowchart works best: